Abstract. We consider the propositional logic equipped with Chellas stit operators for a finite set of individual agents plus the historical necessity modality. We settle the question of whether such a logic enjoys restricted interpolation property, which requires the existence of an interpolant only in cases where the consequence contains no Chellas stit operators occurring in the premise. We show that if action operators count as logical symbols, then such a logic has restricted interpolation property iff the number of agents does not exceed three. On the other hand, if action operators are considered to be non-logical symbols, the restricted interpolation fails for any number of agents exceeding one. It follows that unrestricted Craig interpolation also fails for almost all versions of stit logic.
Introduction
The so-called stit logic is the modal logic of actions that uses the locution 'j sees to it that A' (where j is an agent name and A a sentence) as its paradigm of action modality. The very name 'stit' derives from the acronym of this paradigm locution. This logic has been present and explored in the literature on philosophical logic at least since the 1980s. Many of the early defining texts in the stit tradition were authored and coauthored by N. Belnap, and the book [2] is a useful guide to the early steps of this type of research and its attending controversies. However, in [2] N. Belnap comes forward as a proponent of the so-called achievement stit operator, whereas the later work in stit logic mainly concentrated around the Chellas stit and deliberative stit operators.
1 Deliberative stit operator was independently proposed by F. von Kutschera (see, e.g. [13] ) and J. Horty (see, e.g., [8] ). The present paper follows this line so that the name of stit logic gets applied to the logic of Chellas stit/deliberative stit operator with Chellas stit taken as the basic stit operator, and deliberative stit as the defined one.
Most of the work on stit logic since these early days had a conceptual focus, applying stit semantics to modelling philosophical questions and exploring alternative stit operators which were proposed as improved versions of achievement and deliberative stit in some respect (see, e.g., [3] ). More recently emerged the attempts to enrich stit logic with other types of operators, e.g. the ones borrowed from temporal logic (see, e.g., [9] ) or justification logic (see, e.g., [10] and [11] ). Sometimes these attempts were intertwined with attempts to recast the stit semantics itself so as to make it more suitable for the enrichment in question.
As for the more technical work on stit logic, it mostly concentrated on forging axiomatizations and, to some extent, solving the computational complexity questions. Some of the relatively recent important contributions to this research are e.g. [6] and [1] .
One of the standard refinements of completeness results is the Craig Interpolation Property. However, to the best of our knowledge, this direction of research in stit logic has yet to see its first contributions. We hope that our paper will be able to cover this gap at least to some extent. The paper mainly focuses on a restriction of the Craig Interpolation Property which only requires existence of an interpolant if the antecedent shares no agent names with the consequent. However, we show that even this weakened version of interpolation property fails for stit logic if the logic deals with more than three different agents. Of course, the failure of restricted Craig interpolation entails also the failure of the unrestricted interpolation property. Therefore, an easy corollary to the main result of this paper is the failure of unrestricted Craig interpolation in stit logic for any number of agents exceeding three, which yields the negative solution to the problem of Craig interpolation for the vast majority of variants of the basic stit logic.
We now briefly touch upon the structure of the text below. Section 2 defines the version of stit logic at hand in terms of language, semantics, and a strongly complete axiomatization. We also introduce the main notations to be used in the paper and give the precise definition of the Restricted Craig Interpolation Property for stit logic of n agents. The latter property will be the main subject of the two following sections. We are going to show, first, that whenever our version of stit logic has no more than three different agents, it enjoys this property. The proof of this positive part of our main result is given in Section 3. The corresponding negative part, saying that the Restricted Craig Interpolation Property fails for stit logic with more than three agents, is then formulated and proven in Section 4. After that, Section 5 explores the various corollaries of the main result in relation to the following topics: (a) unrestricted Craig interpolation, (b) the Restricted Robinson Consistency Property, and (c) the stronger versions of both unrestricted and restricted interpolation property which treat stit operators as non-logical symbols.
Section 6 sums up the preceding sections and charts some natural continuations for the line of research presented in the paper.
Preliminaries
On the basis of a given a finite agent community Ag and a set of propositional variables V , we define the set L Ag V of (Ag, V )-stit formulas as follows:
where p ∈ V and j ∈ Ag. Stit formulas will be denoted by letters A, B, C, D, decorated with sub-and superscripts whenever needed. Formulas of the type ✷A and [j]A are informally read as 'A is (historically) necessary' and 'the agent j sees to it that A', respectively. We reserve ✸A and j A as the notations for the duals of these modalities.
Modalities of the form [j] for j ∈ Ag are called action modalities and will be interpreted as Chellas stit operators for the respective agent j. We will not use deliberative stit operator [d : j] in this paper, but it can be defined on the basis of Chellas stit and historical necessity:
Although Ag is normally assumed to be non-empty, in this paper we will allow for Ag = ∅ as a border case for the sake of notational convenience. The set L ∅ V is then basically a variant of the language of the logic of historical necessity. This logic is known to coincide with propositional S5 and hence has Craig Interpolation Property.
2 Therefore, even though empty agent communities are allowed by our notation, we will not consider interpolation properties of the languages devoid of action modalities in this paper.
Stit formulas are interpreted over the respective classes of stit models. An (Ag, V )-stit model is a structure of the form S = T ree, ≤, Choice, V , such that:
• T ree is a non-empty set. Elements of T ree are called moments.
• ≤ is a partial order on T ree for which a temporal interpretation is assumed.
• Hist(T ree, ≤) is the set of maximal chains in T ree w.r.t. ≤. Since Hist(T ree, ≤)
is completely determined by T ree and ≤, it is not included into the structure of a model as a separate component. Elements of Hist(T ree, ≤) are called histories. The set of histories containing a given moment m will be denoted H S m . The following set
called the set of moment-history pairs, will be used to evaluate formulas in L Ag V . Two histories, h, g ∈ H S m we call undivided at m ∈ T ree and write h ≈ m g iff h and g share some later moment m ′ . In other words, we stipulate that:
• Choice is a function mapping T ree × Ag into 2 2 Hist(T ree,≤) in such a way that for any given j ∈ Ag and m ∈ T ree we have as Choice(m, j) (to be denoted as Choice j (otherwise called a choice cell ) containing h. Intuitively, the idea is that j cannot distinguish by her activity at m between histories that belong to one and the same choice cell. 2 In fact, propositional S5 even has the stronger Lyndon interpolation property, see e.g [5, Theorem 5.14, p. 140].
• V is an evaluation function, mapping the set V into 2
MH(T ree,≤)
In what follows, for a given (Ag, V )-stit model S = T ree, ≤, Choice, V , we will sometimes use Hist(S) and M H(S) to denote Hist(T ree, ≤) and M H(T ree, ≤), respectively.
Additionally, every stit model S is required to satisfy the following constraints:
In addition to the axioms, S contains two inference rules:
Provability of A in S we will denote by ⊢ A. It is clear that the strong completeness of S also implies compactness of stit logic for any given finite community Ag of agents and any given set V of propositional variables. We introduce some further useful notations related to sets of stit formulas. If Γ ⊆ L Ag V , then we let Γ ✷ denote the set of all boxed formulas from Γ. Similarly, whenever j ∈ Ag, we use Γ
[j] to denote the set
For arbitrary Ag, V , and a set Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L Ag V , we extend the notation ⊢ to contexts like Γ ⊢ A to mean that 
∈ Γ by choice of A, and if ¬A ∈ Γ, then {A, ¬A} ⊆ Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ Ξ, which contradicts the consistency of Ξ since, of course, ⊢ (A ∧ ¬A) → ⊥. Therefore, we must also have ¬A / ∈ Γ so that {A, ¬A} ∩ Γ = ∅.
For a Γ ⊆ L
Ag V we define that:
and:
Ag(Γ) := {j ∈ Ag | j occurs in Γ}, If Γ is a singleton {A}, then we use the notations |A| and Ag(A) instead of |{A}| and Ag({A}). In this paper we will be mainly testing the applicability to stit logic of the following property: Definition 1. For a positive integer n, stit logic has the Restricted n-Craig Interpolation Property (abbreviated by (RCIP ) n ) iff for any set of propositional variables V , and all A, B ∈ L {1,...,n} V , whenever ⊢ A → B and Ag(A) ∩ Ag(B) = ∅, then there exists a C ∈ L Ag(A)∪Ag(B) |A|∩|B| such that both ⊢ A → C and ⊢ C → B.
3 The case n ≤ 3
The main result of this section looks as follows: Theorem 1. For every n ≤ 3, stit logic has (RCIP ) n .
We prepare the result by proving several technical lemmas first.
Lemma 2. The following statements are true:
1. For every agent index j, [j] is an S5-modality.
. . , i n , j ∈ Ag be pairwise different, and let
Proof. (Part 1). Immediately by (A1), (Nec), and (A2).
(Part 2). Assume the hypothesis of Part 2 and assume that we have:
Then we reason as follows:
(by (6) and prop. logic) (7)
(by (5) and (7)) (8) From (8), it follows by propositional logic that
(Part 3). We reason as follows:
(by (9) and Part 1) (10)
(by (10) and Part 1)
(by (12) and (13)
(by (11) and (14)) (15)
(by (15) and S5 properties of ✷)
Assume that V is a set of propositional variables and Ag a finite community of agents. A pair (Γ, ∆) of sets of (Ag, V )-stit formulas, is called inseparable, iff
it is true that both Γ ⊢ A and ∆ ⊢ ¬A. Below we basically repeat the classical argument for the proof of the following standard lemma about inseparability: Lemma 3. Let (Γ, ∆) be an inseparable pair, and assume that both |Γ| and |∆| are at most countable.
4 Then: 
and L
Ag(∆) |∆|
, respectively. The definition is as follows. Γ 0 and ∆ 0 are just Γ and ∆, and whenever Γ r and ∆ r are defined for an r ∈ ω, then we set:
and, further:
Claim 1. For every r ∈ ω, the pairs (Γ r , ∆ r ) and (Γ r+1 , ∆ r ) are inseparable. The Claim is proved by induction on r. If r = 0 then (Γ 0 , ∆ 0 ) = (Γ, ∆) is inseparable by the assumption of the lemma, and the inseparability of (Γ 1 , ∆ 0 ) follows by the definition of Γ 1 . If r = s + 1, then (Γ s+1 , ∆ s ) is inseparable by the induction hypothesis, whence the inseparability of (Γ s+1 , ∆ s+1 ) follows by the definition of ∆ s+1 . From the latter, the inseparability of (Γ s+2 , ∆ s+1 ) follows by the definition of Γ s+2 . Claim 1 is proved.
We now set:
We clearly have both:
and:
4 This lemma also holds for uncountable sets of variables but we will not need this more general version in the present paper.
We now show a series of further claims:
Claim 2. 
Then we will have A = A r and ¬A = A r ′ for some r, r ′ ∈ ω in terms of our enumeration of L
such that all of the following holds:
We then infer, by propositional logic, that:
Now set r ′′ := max(r, r ′ ). By (17) and (18) we know that {A
. Therefore, it follows from (23) and (24) 
′ are maxiconsistent, they are closed for finite conjunctions. Therefore, we can assume wlog, that there are
Then let r, s ∈ ω be such that A ∈ Γ r and B ∈ ∆ s . Setting t := max(r, s), we know that A ∈ Γ t and B ∈ ∆ t whence it follows that (Γ t , ∆ t ) is separable, in contradiction to Claim 1. Claims 2-4 then imply the first part of the Lemma.
(Part 2). Immediate from the definition of separability.
it is true that both Γ ⊢ A and ∆ ⊢ ¬A. By definition, this means that there are A 1 , . . . , A r ∈ Γ and
Next we prove two lemmas which sum up some important facts about inseparability that are peculiar to stit logic:
Then the pair:
is inseparable.
Proof. Assume the hypothesis, and assume, for reductio, that (27) is separable. Then, by compactness of stit logic and the S5 properties of ✷, there must be ✷A ∈ Γ, ✷B ∈ ∆, and C ∈ L Ag(Γ)∪Ag(∆) |Γ|∩|∆| such that both of the following equations hold:
and
Since Ag(Γ)∩Ag(∆) = ∅, all of the agent indices in the united sequence j 1 , . . . , j r , i 1 , . . . , i s must be pairwise different and we must have r + s ≤ n. Therefore, r + s ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} which gives us our three cases below. Although these cases show many similarities, we consider them separately. In every case we reason by contraposition, showing that the separability of (27) (expressed by (28) and (29)) implies the separability of (Γ, ∆), thus contradicting the initial assumption of the lemma. Case 1. Let {r, s} = {1, 2}. Assume, wlog, that r = 2 and s = 1, the other subcase is symmetric. Then, by (28) and (29), there exist i, j and k such that {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}, and that both of the following hold:
By Lemma 2.2, (30), and propositional logic, we get that:
On the other hand, by Lemma 2.3 and (31):
Since C, by its choice, is in L
, and we also have, by the initial choice of our formulas, that ✷A,
Therefore, it follows from (32) and (33), that (Γ, ∆) is separable.
Case 2. Let {r, s} = {1}. Then, by (28) and (29), there exist i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that i = j and both of the following hold:
By Lemma 2.2 and (34) we get that:
On the other hand, by Lemma 2.3 and (35):
, and we also have, by the initial choice of our formulas, that ✷A, ✸[i]A 1 ∈ Γ and ✷B, ✸[j]B 1 ∈ ∆. Therefore, it follows from (36) and (37), that (Γ, ∆) is again separable, contrary to our assumptions.
Case 3. 0 ∈ {r, s}. We may assume, wlog, that s = 0, the other subcase being symmetric. By (29), we must have then:
By S5 properties of ✷, we get then:
It follows then, by the choice of the formulas involved, that (Γ, ∆) is separable, contrary to our assumptions. This exhausts the list of possible cases and thus the Lemma is proved.
Lemma 6. Let V be a set of propositional variables, Ag a finite agent community, and let Γ, ∆ ⊆ L Ag V be such that (Γ, ∆) is inseparable. Moreover, assume that Γ is (Ag(Γ), |Γ|)-maxiconsistent and ∆ is (Ag(∆), |∆|)-maxiconsistent. Then:
Proof. (Part 1). Assume the hypothesis. If the pair (Γ ✷ ∪ {¬A 1 }, ∆ ✷ ) is separable, then, by compactness of stit logic, maxiconsistency of Γ and ∆, and S5 properties of all the modalities in stit logic, there must be ✷A ∈ Γ, ✷B ∈ ∆, and C ∈ L Ag(Γ)∪Ag(∆) |Γ|∩|∆| such that (38) holds together with the following equation:
From (41) we infer, using S5 properties of ✷:
On the other hand, from (38) we infer (40) arguing as in Case 3 in the proof of Lemma 5 above. Taken together, (40) and (42) show separability of (Γ, ∆), contrary to our assumptions. Therefore, (41) and (38) cannot hold, whence (Γ ✷ ∪ {¬A 1 }, ∆ ✷ ) must be inseparable, and we are done.
Part 2 is symmetric to Part 1. 
(Part 3). Assume the hypothesis. If the pair (Γ
Next we infer: (45) and (46)
We also infer (40) from (38), arguing as in Case 3 in the proof of Lemma 5 above. From (40) and (A2) it then follows that:
Taken together, (48) and (49) show separability of (Γ, ∆), contrary to our assumptions. Therefore, (43) and (38) cannot hold together, whence (Γ ✷ ∪ Γ [j] ∪ {¬A 1 }, ∆ ✷ ) must be inseparable, and we are done.
Part 4 is symmetric to Part 3.
We are now prepared to prove Theorem 1. Assume that n ≤ 3, assume for reductio, that A, B ∈ L {1,...,n} V , and we have
we have both ⊢ A → C and ⊢ C → B. This means that the pair ({A}, {¬B}) is inseparable and can be extended, using Lemma 3, to an inseparable pair (Ξ 0 , Ξ 1 ) such that Ξ 0 is (Ag(A), |A|)-maxiconsistent and Ξ 1 is (Ag(B), |B|)-maxiconsistent. We now define a (Ag(A) ∪ Ag(B), |A| ∪ |B|)-stit model S which we will show to satisfy Ξ 0 ∪ Ξ 1 . Now we start defining components of S = T ree, ≤, Choice, V :
• We first define the set of standard pairs as the set of all inseparable pairs (Γ, ∆) such that Γ is (Ag(A), |A|)-maxiconsistent, ∆ is (Ag(B), |B|)-maxiconsistent, and the following condition holds:
The set of standard pairs is non-empty since (Ξ 0 , Ξ 1 ) is clearly a standard pair.
• We then define T ree as the set of all standard pairs plus a single additional moment †.
• ≤ is the reflexive closure of the relation {( †, (Γ, ∆)) | (Γ, ∆) is a standard pair } Immediately we get the following lemma:
, the other part is similar. We have Ξ We pause to reflect on the structure of histories induced by the pair (T ree, ≤). Every such history has the form h (Γ,∆) = { †, (Γ, ∆)}. It is clear, moreover, that we have both H S † = Hist(S) and H (Γ,∆) = {h (Γ,∆) } for every standard pair (Γ, ∆). We then define the choice function for our model in the following way:
• For every j ∈ Ag(A) and standard pairs (Γ, ∆) and (Γ 0 , ∆ 0 ), we define that
• Similarly, for every i ∈ Ag(B) and standard pairs (Γ, ∆) and
• For every j ∈ Ag(A)∪Ag(B) and every standard pair (Γ, ∆) we set that Choice
• Finally, for a p ∈ |A|, we define that V (p) = {( †, (Γ, ∆)) | p ∈ Γ}; symmetrically, for a q ∈ |B|, we define that
First of all, we need to show that we have in fact defined a stit model: As for the constraints, (HC) is satisfied since † is the ≤-least moment in T ree and (NCUH) is satisfied because there are no undivided histories in S. We consider (IA). Let m ∈ T ree and let f be a function on Ag such that (∀j ∈ Ag(A)∪Ag(B))(f (j) ∈ Choice m j ). We are going to show that in this case j∈Ag(A)∪Ag(B) f (j) = ∅. If m = †, then this is obvious, since every agent will have a vacuous choice. We treat the case when m = †.
Then, for every j ∈ Ag(A)∪Ag(B), we pick an
Now consider the pair:
We will show that the pair (51) is inseparable. Indeed, suppose otherwise. Then, by Lemma 4, there must be
r(i) ∈ ∆ i (for every i ∈ Ag(B)) such that the pair:
is separable. Now the contraposition of Lemma 3.2 entails that in this case also the pair:
must be separable. Next, for every j ∈ Ag(A) and every i ∈ Ag(B), we set:
By Lemma 2.1 and the separability of the pair (53), we know that also the following pair must be separable:
For every j ∈ Ag(A), the formulas
were chosen in Γ j , therefore, it follows from Lemma 2.1 and maxiconsistency of Γ j that also [j]α j ∈ Γ j . By S5 properties of ✷, this means that also ✸[j]α j ∈ Γ j so that, by consistency,
The latter means, by Lemma 7, that ✷¬[j]α j / ∈ Ξ 0 , therefore, by maxiconsistency, ✸[j]α j ∈ Ξ 0 . By a parallel argument, one can also show that, for every i ∈ Ag(B), ✸[i]β i ∈ Ξ 1 . Therefore, by Lemma 5, the separability of the pair (54) entails the separability of (Ξ 0 , Ξ 1 ) which contradicts the choice of the latter pair. The obtained contradiction shows that the pair (51) must be inseparable.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.1, the pair (51) can be extended to a pair (Γ 0 , ∆ 0 ) such that Γ 0 is (Ag(A), |A|)-maxiconsistent and ∆ 0 is (Ag(B) , |B|)-maxiconsistent. By the choice of (51), it is also clear that both Ξ ✷ 0 ⊆ Γ 0 and Ξ ✷ 1 ⊆ ∆ 0 , which means that (Γ 0 , ∆ 0 ) is a standard pair. Therefore, we must have h (Γ0,∆0) ∈ H S † . Now, let j ∈ Ag(A). Then, by the choice of (51), Γ
[j] j ⊆ Γ 0 , whence we get, by (50) and the definition of Choice, that h (Γ0,∆0) ∈ Choice † j (h (Γj ,∆j ) ) = f (j). Similarly, if i ∈ Ag(B), then, by the choice of (51), ∆ [i] i ⊆ ∆ 0 , whence we get, by (50) and the definition of Choice, that h (Γ0,∆0) ∈ Choice † i (h (Γi,∆i) ) = f (i). Summing up, we obtain that: . Then:
Proof. We show Part 1, the other part is similar. The proof proceeds by induction on the construction of C.
Basis. C = p ∈ |Γ|. Then:
by the definition of V above. Induction step. The Boolean cases are strightforward. We treat the modal cases: Case 1. C = ✷D. (⇐) Assume that ✷D ∈ Γ and take an arbitrary g ∈ H S † . We will show that S, †, g |= D. Indeed, we must have g = h (Γ0,∆0) for an appropriate standard pair (Γ 0 , ∆ 0 ). By Lemma 7, we must have
, whence it follows that ✷D ∈ Γ 0 . By S5 properties of ✷ and (Ag(A), |A|)-maxiconsistency of Γ 0 , it follows further that D ∈ Γ 0 , whence S, †, g(= h (Γ0,∆0) ) |= D by induction hypothesis. Since g was chosen in H S † arbitrarily, it follows that S, †, h (Γ,∆) |= ✷D. (⇒). Assume that ✷D / ∈ Γ. By (Ag(A), |A|)-maxiconsistency of Γ, we must have then that ¬✷D ∈ Γ, which, by Lemma 6.1, means that the pair (Γ ✷ ∪ {¬D}, ∆ ✷ ) must be inseparable. By Lemma 7, we know that also the pair (Ξ ✷ 0 ∪ {¬D}, Ξ ✷ 1 ) must be inseparable. We then extend the latter pair, using Lemma 3.1, to a standard pair (Γ 0 , ∆ 0 ). It is clear that D / ∈ Γ 0 , hence, by induction hypothesis, S, †, h (Γ0,∆0) |= D. Since h (Γ0,∆0) ∈ H S † , this further means that S, †, h (Γ,∆) |= ✷D, as desired. ,∆) ). We will show that S, †, g |= D. Indeed, we must have g = h (Γ0,∆0) for an appropriate standard pair (Γ 0 , ∆ 0 ). Given that h (Γ0,∆0) = g ∈ Choice † j (h (Γ,∆) ), we must also have, by the definition of Choice, that Γ We can now finish our proof of Theorem 1 by recalling the fact that we have, according to the above assumption, both A ∈ Ξ 0 and ¬B ∈ Ξ 1 , so that it follows from Lemma 9, that:
The latter is in contradiction with the assumption that ⊢ A → B, and this contradiction means that there must be an interpolant for this implication.
The case n > 3
The main result of this section looks as follows:
Theorem 2. For every n > 3, stit logic does not have (RCIP ) n .
Again, we start with some technicalities:
Lemma 10. Let j 1 , j 2 , j 3 , j 4 ∈ Ag and propositional variables p, q, r be pairwise different. Then:
Proof. We reason as follows: (59) and (62) 
We show that existence of a bisimulation implies the equality of theories: Now we need to define two models: a ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {p, q})-stit model S = T ree, ≤, Choice, V , and a ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {q, r})-stit model S ′ = T ree ′ , ≤ ′ , Choice ′ , V ′ to be used in the proof of Theorem 2. First, we define one auxiliary set:
Next, we start with the definitions of the models, beginning with their temporal substructures.
Definition 3. We set:
1. T ree := { †} ∪ 4T up.
2. ≤ is the reflexive closure of {( †, m) | m ∈ 4T up}.
T ree
For an integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, by the j-th projection of m ∈ 4T up = T ree ∩ T ree ′ we will mean the j-th projection of the corresponding 4-tuple, regardless of whether m is signed by + or −. Thus, for any appropriate a, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1}, the two elements (a, b, c, d) + and (a, b, c, d) − have the same j-th projection for every 1 ≤ j ≤ 4. For an m ∈ 4T up and an integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, the j-th projection of m will be denoted by pr j (m). The element from {+, −} by which m is signed, we will denote sign(m) so that, e.g., sign((a, b, c, d) + ) = +. Finally, the complete 4-tuple signed by sign(m) will be called the core of m and will be denoted by core(m) so that core(m) = (pr 1 (m), pr 2 (m), pr 3 (m), pr 4 (m)).
The history structure induced by these definitions is as follows. For S we get that:
Similarly, for S ′ we get that:
Once we know the sets of histories induced by S and S ′ , respectively, it is immediate to deduce the fans of histories passing through any given moment in these models. Namely, it follows that:
This insight into the history structure allows for a handy definition of choice functions and variable evaluations for the two models: Definition 4. We set that:
We now establish a number of further lemmas and corollaries.
Proof. The Corollary follows immediately from Definition 4.1 and 4.4, and the fact that for every m ∈ 4T up we have either pr j (m) = 0 or pr j (m) = 1.
Lemma 12. S, as given in Definitions 3 and 4, is a ({1, 2, 3, 4} , {p, q})-stit model, whereas S ′ , as given in the same Definitions, is a ({1, 2, 3, 4} , {q, r})-stit model.
Proof. We consider S first. Indeed, ≤ is obviously a forward-branching partial order and † is the ≤-least element in T ree so that (HC) is satisfied. Also, there are no undivided histories at any moment of T ree so that (NCUH) is also satisfied trivially. Next, for any m ∈ 4T up and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, Choice 
The proof of the Lemma for S ′ is similar.
Lemma 13. We have both:
for all m ∈ 4T up.
Proof. As for the first part of the Lemma, let m := (0, 0, 0, 0) + and consider h m . If h ∈ Choice † 1 (h m ) is chosen arbitrarily, then, by (66), h = h m1 for some m 1 ∈ 4T up and, moreover,
Furthermore, let h ∈ Choice † 2 (h m ) be chosen arbitrarily. Then, again by (66), h = h m1 for some m 1 ∈ 4T up and, moreover, pr 2 (m 1 ) = pr 2 (m) = 0. If S, †, h m1 |= p, this means that ( †, h m1 ) ∈ V (p) so that also pr 1 (m 1 ) = 0. But in this case we will have pr 1 (m 1 ) = pr 2 (m 1 ) = 0 which means that also S, †, h m1 |= q. Thus we have shown, for an arbitrary h m1 ∈ Choice † 2 (h m ), that whenever S, †, h m1 |= p, it is also the case that S, †, h m1 |= q whence it follows that S, †, h m |= [2] (p → q).
Summing up, we must have S, †, h m |= [1]p∧ [2] (p → q) for m = (0, 0, 0, 0) + , whence, given the semantics of ✷ and (66), it follows that S,
Turning now to the second part of the Lemma, we set m := (0, 0, 1, 0) + and consider g m . If g ∈ Choice ′ ‡ 3 (g m ) is chosen arbitrarily, then, by (66), g = g m1 for some m 1 ∈ 4T up and, moreover, pr 3 (m 1 ) = pr 3 (m) = 1. But then, by Definition 4.6, ( ‡, g m1 ) ∈ V ′ (r) so that S ′ , ‡, g m1 |= r. Since g m1 ∈ Choice ′ ‡ 3 (g m ) was arbitrary, this means that S ′ , ‡, g m |= [3]r. Furthermore, let g ∈ Choice ′ ‡ 4 (g m ) be chosen arbitrarily. Then, again by (66), g = g m1 for some m 1 ∈ 4T up and, moreover, pr 4 (m 1 ) = pr 4 (m) = 0. If S ′ , ‡, g m1 |= r, this means that ( ‡, g m1 ) ∈ V ′ (r) so that also pr 3 (m 1 ) = 1. But in this case we will have both pr 3 (m 1 ) = 1 and pr 4 (m 1 ) = 0 which means that also S ′ , ‡, g m1 |= ¬q. Thus we have shown, for an arbitrary g m1 ∈ Choice ′ ‡ 4 (g m ), that whenever S ′ , ‡, g m1 |= r, it is also the case that S ′ , ‡, g m1 |= ¬q whence it follows that
(r → ¬q) for m = (0, 0, 1, 0) + , which means, given the semantics of ✷ and (67), that
In what follows we let S q and S ′ q stand for the reducts of S and S ′ to ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {q})-stit models.
Proof. We first note that it follows from Definition 4.6 that ( ‡,
In the former case, we get h m B g (0,0,0,0) + , in the latter case we get h m B g (0,0,1,0) + . Therefore, by (64) and (66), the domain of B is {h m | m ∈ 4T up} = H S † , as desired. As for the counterdomain, we may argue in the same fashion, noting that it follows from definition of V that ( †, h (0,0,0,0) + ) ∈ V (q) and ( †, h (0,1,0,1) − ) / ∈ V (q). Thus, we also get that the counterdomain of B is {g m | m ∈ 4T up} = H Condition (forth). Assume that m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ∈ 4T up and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 are such that we have both h m1 B g m2 and h m3 ∈ Choice † j (h m1 ). We need to consider the following cases:
. Then note that we have both g m2 ∈ Choice ′ ‡ j (g m2 ) and h m3 B g m2 , the latter by definition of B.
On the other hand, we have, by the identity of cores and Corollary 1, that g core(m2) − ∈ Choice ′ ‡ j (g m2 ). Case 2b. We have core(m 2 ) = (a, b, 0, 0) for some a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Now, if j ∈ {1, 2, 4} we note that for m 4 := (a, b, 1, 0)
+ we have g m4 ∈ Choice ′ ‡ j (g m2 ) and also ( ‡, g m4 ) / ∈ V ′ (q) so that h m3 B g m4 . On the other hand, if j = 3, then we set m 4 := (a, b, 0, 1) − and, again, get g m4 ∈ Choice ′ ‡ j (g m2 ) and also ( ‡, g m4 ) / ∈ V ′ (q) so that h m3 B g m4 . Case 3. We have ( †, h m1 ) / ∈ V (q), but ( †, h m3 ) ∈ V (q). Then, by h m1 B g m2 , also ( ‡, g m2 ) / ∈ V ′ (q) which means that core(m 2 ) = (a, b, 0, 0) for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Case 3a. We have, moreover, that core(m 2 ) = (a, b, 1, 0) for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Then we must have ( ‡, g core(m2) + ) ∈ V ′ (q) so that h m3 B g core(m2) + . On the other hand, we have, by the identity of cores and Corollary 1, that g core(m2) + ∈ Choice ′ ‡ j (g m2 ). Case 3b. We have core(m 2 ) = (a, b, 1, 0) for some a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Now, if j ∈ {1, 2, 4} we note that for m 4 := (a, b, 0, 0)
+ we have g m4 ∈ Choice ′ ‡ j (g m2 ) and also ( ‡, g m4 ) ∈ V ′ (q) so that h m3 B g m4 . On the other hand, if j = 3, then we set m 4 := (a, b, 1, 1) + and, again, get g m4 ∈ Choice ′ ‡ j (g m2 ) and also ( ‡, g m4 ) ∈ V ′ (q) so that h m3 B g m4 . Condition (back). Assume that m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ∈ 4T up and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 are such that we have both h m1 B g m2 and g m3 ∈ Choice ′ ‡ j (g m2 ). We need to consider the following cases:
. Then note that we have both h m1 ∈ Choice † j (h m1 ) and h m1 B g m3 , the latter by definition of B.
For all a, b ∈ {0, 1}, we have both m 1 = (a, b, 0, 0) and m 1 = (0, 0, a, b) . Then we must have ( †, h core(m1) − ) / ∈ V (q) so that h core(m1) − B g m3 . On the other hand, we have, by the identity of cores, that h core(m1) − ∈ Choice † j (h m1 ). Case 2b. We have core(m 1 ) = (0, 0, 0, 0). Now, if j ∈ {1, 3}, we note that for m 4 := (0, 1, 0, 1)
− we have g m4 ∈ Choice † j (h m1 ) and also ( †, h m4 ) / ∈ V (q) so that h (0,1,0,1) − B g m3 . On the other hand, if j ∈ {2, 4}, then we set m 4 := (1, 0, 1, 0)
Case 2c. We have core(m 1 ) = (0, 0, a, b) for some a, b ∈ {0, 1} such that (a, b) = (0, 0). Then we have to instantiate j:
For j = 1, we set m 4 := (0, 1, a, b) − . For j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, we set m 4 := (1, 0, a, b) − . Under these settings, we always get both h m4 ∈ Choice † j (h m1 ) for the respective j, and ( †, h m4 ) / ∈ V (q) so that h m4 B g m3 . Case 2d. We have core(m 1 ) = (a, b, 0, 0) for some a, b ∈ {0, 1} such that (a, b) = (0, 0). Then we have to instantiate j:
For j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we set m 4 := (a, b, 0, 1) − . For j = 4, we set m 4 := (a, b, 1, 0)
− . Under these settings, we always get both h m4 ∈ Choice † j (h m1 ) for the respective j, and ( †, h m4 ) / ∈ V (q) so that h m4 B g m3 . Case 3. We have ( ‡, g m2 ) / ∈ V ′ (q), but ( ‡, g m3 ) ∈ V ′ (q). Then we must have ( †, h core(m1) + ) ∈ V (q) so that h core(m1) + B g m3 . On the other hand, we have, by the identity of cores and Corollary 1, that h core(m1) + ∈ Choice † j (h m1 ).
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume for reductio, that stit logic has (RCIP ) n for some n > 3. that we must also have S ′ , ‡, g (0,0,0,0) + |= B. But the latter is in contradiction with Lemma 13 which says that, on the contrary, S ′ , ‡, g (0,0,0,0) + |= B. So we have got our contradiction in place.
Further developments and ramifications
The main topic of this paper is the Restricted Interpolation Property as given by Definition 1. This property is much weaker than the simple Craig Interpolation Property which has attracted much more attention in the existing literature, and for a good reason. In the context of stit logic, we may formulate the Craig Interpolation Property as follows: Thus we may infer from the results of the above sections that stit logic fails (CIP ) n for almost all positive integers n. The failure of (CIP ) n further entails, by the standard argument, the failure of the Robinson Consistency Property for the respective values of n. Furthermore, Theorem 1 allows us to considerably limit our search for counterexamples to (CIP ) n for the remaining few values of n. Namely, it follows from Theorem 1 that whenever ⊢ A → B does not have an interpolant in the sense of Definition 5, then we must have Ag(A) ∩ Ag(B) = ∅.
Turning again to the Robinson Consistency Property and its variants, Definition 1 raises a natural question whether (RCIP ) n has its accompanying restricted version of the Robinson Consistency Property. The answer is yes, and the respective version of the Robinson Consistency Property can be formulated as follows: On the basis of this definition and the proofs given in Sections 3 and 4, the following theorem can be established:
Theorem 3. For every positive integer n, stit logic has (RRCP ) n iff it has (RCIP ) n .
Proof (a sketch). By a standard argument, one can show that whenever stit logic fails (RCIP ) n , it also fails (RRCP ) n . In the other direction, an obvious modification of the proof of Theorem 1 given above shows that stit logic has (RRCP ) n for all n ≤ 3.
Finally, we tackle the question of the logical status of action modalities. Definition 1 treats action modalities of the form [j] for a j ∈ Ag as logical symbols, and this is in accordance with the standard view of modalities. But it is easy to see that one can also argue in favor of non-logical status of these modalities, since the agent indices are often treated as proper names of respective agents, and proper names are non-logical. If this attitude is carried out systematically, then we get the following strengthening of Definition 1: One immediately sees that (SRCIP ) n only differs from (RCIP ) n in placing stricter requirements on the interpolant. Therefore, for any given positive integer n, the failure of (RCIP ) n for stit logic entails the failure of (SRCIP ) n so that it follows from Theorem 2 that stit logic fails (SRCIP ) n for all positive integers n > 3. This result, however, can be improved as follows:
Theorem 4. For every n > 1, stit logic does not have (SRCIP ) n .
In order to prove this theorem, we again need to establish a number of technical claims:
Lemma 15. Let j 1 , j 2 ∈ Ag be different and let p be a propositional variable. Then:
Proof. We reason as follows: (68) and (70) Proof. We reason in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 11, the only difference being that Case 2 in the induction step can be omitted.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider the following sets and structures:
• T r = {m, m 0 , m 1 }.
• ✂ is the reflexive closure of the relation {(m, m 0 ), (m, m 1 )}.
The two histories induced by (T r, ✂) are h 0 = {m, m 0 } and h 1 = {m, m 1 }. We now define two further sets:
• U = {(m, h 0 )}.
• F = {(m, {{h 0 }, {h 1 }}), (m 0 , {{h 0 }}), (m 1 , {{h 1 }})}.
It is immediate to establish that the structure M j,p = (T r, ✂, F j , U p ), in which if F j interprets F as the choice function for a given single agent j and U p interprets U as the evaluation for a given single propositional variable p, is a ({j}, {p})-stit structure. We now consider two stit models, M 1,p and M 2,p , and we set B as the diagonal of Hist(T r, ✂), in other words, we set B := {(h 0 , h 0 ), (h 1 , h 1 )}. It is clear that B satisfies the conditions of Lemma 16 so that for every C ∈ L ∅ {p} which contains no action modalities, we will have:
Now assume that (SRCIP ) n holds for any n greater than one. We will show that this assumption leads to a contradiction. Indeed, it follows then from Lemma 15 that there must be a formula C ∈ L ∅ {p} such that the following holds:
Choose any such C. We obviously have M 1,p , m, h 0 |= ✸ [1] p so that it follows from (73) and the soundness of S that M 1,p , m, h 0 |= C, whence, by (72), also M 2,p , m, h 0 |= C. From the latter, together with (74), it follows that we should have M 2,p , m, h 0 |= ¬✸ [2] ¬p, whereas the direct check shows that we in fact have M 2,p , m, h 0 |= ✸ [2] ¬p. Thus we have got our contradiction in place.
The Strong Restricted Craig Interpolation Property admits of the following unrestricted companion: Of course, for a given positive integer n, (SCIP ) n is at least as strong as (SRCIP ) n , whence we get the following corollary to Theorem 4:
Theorem 5. For every n > 1, stit logic does not have (SCIP ) n .
Conclusion
In the preceding text, we have looked into the question of whether stit logic has the Restricted n-Craig Interpolation Property, showing that the answer is in the affirmative iff n ≤ 3. We have also briefly looked into some related properties, showing that the Restricted Craig Interpolation for stit logic has its natural accompanying version of the Robinson Consistency Property which turns out to be equivalent to the Restricted Craig Interpolation for every positive integer n. From these results, we have drawn the corollary that the unrestricted n-Craig Interpolation fails for stit logic under every instantiation of n > 3, that is to say, for almost all positive integers n. We have also shown that if one treats action modalities as non-logical symbols, the scope of interpolation failures extends to include the case when n ∈ {2, 3}, and this extension occurs for the strengthened versions of both unrestricted and restricted n-Craig Interpolation Property.
The import of this almost universal failure of Craig Interpolation for stit logic can be seen sharper if one takes into an account that the axiomatic system S for this logic, as given in Section 2 above, suggests that stit logic is an extension of propositional multi-S5. It is a well-known fact, see e.g. [12] , that multi-S5 has the Craig Interpolation Property. 5 Thus the fact that this property fails for stit logic highlights the fact that the difference between multi-S5 and stit logic is quite substantial. Another conclusion is that, in extending multi-S5, stit logic upsets the delicate balance between deductive power and expressivity which is present in multi-S5.
As the main problem for the future research remains the question whether unrestricted n-Craig Interpolation Property holds for all or at least some n ≤ 3 and whether the natural Robinson Consistency companions of the n-Craig Interpolation Property can be distinguished from this property on this, rather limited, set of values.
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